The Myth of Democratic Failure - Why Political Institutions are Efficient (Paper) di Donald A. Wittman edito da University of Chicago Press
Alta reperibilità

The Myth of Democratic Failure - Why Political Institutions are Efficient (Paper)

Why Political Institutions Are Efficient

EAN:

9780226904238

ISBN:

0226904237

Pagine:
230
Formato:
Paperback
Lingua:
Inglese
Acquistabile con o la

Descrizione The Myth of Democratic Failure - Why Political Institutions are Efficient (Paper)

Acknowledgments1: Introduction: The Market Metaphor2: The Informed Voter3: Electoral-Market Competition and the Control of Opportunistic Behavior4: Transaction Costs and the Design of Government institutions5: Homo Economicus versus Homo Psychologicus: Why Cognitive Psychology DoesNot Explain Democratic Politics6: Legislative Markets and Organization7: Pressure Groups8: Bureaucratic Markets: Why Government Bureaucracies Are Efficient and NotToo Large9: The Market for Regulation10: The Constitution as an Optimal Social Contract and the Role ofTransaction Costs in Constitutional Design11: Majority Rule and Preference Aggregation12: The Distribution of Economic Wealth and Political Power13: The Testing of Theory14: Epilogue: The Burden of ProofReferencesAuthor IndexSubject index

Spedizione gratuita
€ 51.05
o 3 rate da € 17.02 senza interessi con
Disponibile in 10-12 giorni
servizio Prenota Ritiri su libro The Myth of Democratic Failure - Why Political Institutions are Efficient (Paper)
Prenota e ritira
Scegli il punto di consegna e ritira quando vuoi

Recensioni degli utenti

e condividi la tua opinione con gli altri utenti