Mimetic Desire in Theory of Value

Modern psychology is pioneering the return ofhedonism into choice theory. With this comeback ofhedonism, the dialogue between economics andpsychology loops a loop that originates in themarginal revolution, more than a century ago. Theneconomists inspired by advances in psychology wereleading the charge against hedonism spoiling marginalutility theory. This book starts with a reexaminationof the old hedonic critique. Why did utility theorythroughout its history try to eradicate the flawsstressed by the critique? To what extent would it notapply to a utility theory reshaped along the lines ofKahneman's well-being psychology or Ainslie'spicoeconomics? This book shows that old and new hedonism areinherently the same: a hydra with two heads, pleasureas the end, and its behavioral consequence,maximizing. The way out of hedonism requires gettingrid of both, along with utility. This is achieved inRené Girard's theory of mimetic desire, where theutility concept does not have relevance. The bookexplores breaches that this theory allows in choicetheory and in the theory of competition. It ends withan exploration of intentions in an experiment ontrust and reciprocity.