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Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics
The Myth Of Neutrality
- Editore:
Cambridge University Press
- EAN:
9781107032613
- ISBN:
110703261X
- Pagine:
- 390
- Formato:
- Hardback
- Lingua:
- Inglese
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Descrizione Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics
Economists emphasize the role central banks' independence plays in achieving good economic outcomes. Using game theory and data from dozens of countries, Adolph illustrates that central bankers with different career trajectories choose different monetary policies. Central banks run by former bankers favor low inflation, whereas bureaucrats support low unemployment.
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